Managerial Incentives and Stackelberg Equilibria in Oligopoly by Scrimitore, Marcella
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Managerial Incentives and Stackelberg
Equilibria in Oligopoly
Marcella Scrimitore
University of Salento (Italy)
August 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24245/
MPRA Paper No. 24245, posted 8. August 2010 02:28 UTC
Managerial Incentives and Stackelberg
Equilibria in Oligopoly
Marcella Scrimitore *
Abstract
The paper investigates both quantity and price oligopoly games in markets
with a variable number of managerial and entrepreneurial firms which defines
market structure. Following Vickers (Economic Journal, 1985) which estab-
lishes an equivalence between the equilibrium under unilateral delegation and
the Stackelberg quantity equilibrium, the outcomes of these games are com-
pared with the ones in sequential multi-leaders and multi-followers games. The
profitability of a managerial/entrepreneurial attitude vs leadership/followership
is shown to critically depend upon the kind of strategy, price or quantity, and
upon the assumed market structure. Indeed, the latter turns out to be crucial
in determining the equivalence result that is shown to be contingent on the
assumption that just one leader or one managerial firm operate in the market.
A welfare analysis finally highlights the diﬀerences between the delegation and
the sequential games, focusing on the impact of market structure and imperfect
substitutability on the equilibria of the two games.
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1 Introduction
The economic analysis of managerial incentive contracts starting from the con-
tributions of Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) has
given rise in recent years to an extensive literature on strategic delegation. A
game theoretical approach characterizes this literature which basically aims at
examining the strategic implications of delegating decisions to managers acting
on the product market on behalf of the firms’ owners. The general conclusion
achieved in these models is that an owner concerned with profit maximization
potentially benefits from letting a manager not maximize profits when this al-
lows for a strategic advantage over competitors. By taking due account of rivals’
reactions, the owners choose through a compensation contract the optimal ex-
tent of delegation to give their managers, thus motivating these agents according
to their principals’ objectives.
In the past few years the issue of strategic delegation has sparked an intense
debate which contributes to explaining a wide range of competitive situations,
most of which have been studied under a duopoly assumption. Moreover, the
analysis of the strategic role played on the market by firms which manipu-
late incentive contracts has generally focused on the symmetric case in which
both firms are manager-led. More recently, the analysis of strategic delegation
has been extended to cases in which managerial firms compete against profit-
maximizing (entrepreneurial) ones. In a similar context, and within a frame-
work of quantity competition, Vickers (1985) examines an oligopoly with only
one managerial firm and reinterprets unilateral delegation as a Stackelberg so-
lution. Competition among heterogeneous firms has been also addressed within
games which endogenize the choice of hiring a manager. Among these, Basu
(1995) tackles quantity competition between two firms which have to take the
costly decision of hiring a manager and demonstrates that the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the underlying game coincides with the asymmetric solution in
which only the most eﬃcient firm hires a manager and act as the leader of a
Stackelberg game.1 The works of Barros and Grilo (2002) and White (2001) are
also included in this literature.2
The present work is inspired by the Vickers’ work, the analysis of which
is extended in the following directions: we allow for oligopolistic competition
among any given number of managerial and entrepreneurial firms3 and address
competition in prices besides quantities, under the assumption of product diﬀer-
entiation. The analysis of an oligopoly with a variable number of heterogeneous
1This equivalence result between the incentive equilibrium and the Stackelberg outcome
basically highlights how a Stackelberg leadership can arise through the appropriate choice of an
incentive contract. For this reason it can be included in the growing literature on endogenous
Stackelberg leadership (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990, van Damme and Hurkens, 1999, Huck
and Rey-Biel, 2006).
2Barros and Grilo (2002) build a model of vertical diﬀerentiation in which two firms choose
whether to be entrepreneurial or managerial is presentet; White (2001) addresses the endoge-
nous decision to hire a manager taken by private and public firms in an oligopolistic market.
3The managerial hiring decisions are not modeled in this paper which assumes as exogenous
the role played by each firm.
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firms allows us to compare the managerial/entrepreneurial (ME) model with
the correspondent Stackelberg model with multiple leaders and followers (LF),
for any given market structure and any mode of competition, price or quantity.
Given this background, the present paper has two related objectives. First, it
aims at exploring competition in both managerial and sequential markets in
order to examine the impact on firms’ profits and welfare of changes in mar-
ket structure, here defined as the number of delegating over profit-maximizing
firms or as the number of leaders over followers. The profit and welfare com-
parisons across the diﬀerent set-ups allow us to highlight the forces at work in
shaping firms’ incentives and creating welfare gains in diﬀerent market config-
urations. As far as the second objective is concerned, the paper investigates
the role of product substitutability, as a major determinant of firms’ relative
market position, within the above contexts. Comparative statics of the solu-
tions with respect to the parameters describing market structure and product
substitutability is performed in order to identify the potential benefits or dam-
ages associated with firms’ heterogeneity induced by behavioral diﬀerences or a
diﬀerent order of moves.
By extending the analysis of the two models, mostly confined to quantity
competition, to a price competition framework, this paper enriches both the ex-
isting literature on strategic delegation and that on multi-leader-follower games.
As regards strategic delegation, Fershtman and Judd (1987) demonstrate that,
in a duopoly with identical firms, price competition reduces firms’ incentives for
sales maximization and leads to a more collusive outcome. Price competition in
a strategic delegation framework is also tackled in Lambertini (2000). Indeed,
this paper examines a duopoly multi-stage game in which the endogenous as-
signment of roles is addressed as one of the diﬀerent dimensions of competition,4
and discusses the simultaneous price choices with just one delegating firm as one
of the considered sub-games. The equilibrium of this sub-game is shown to be a
Stackelberg-like equilibrium in prices, with a strategic advantage that is shown
to be reverted in favour of entrepreneurial firm which assumes a role analogous
to the second-mover in the correspondent sequential price game.5 To the best
of our knowledge, the analysis of price competition in this kind of framework
has not been extended to the oligopoly case.
The focus of our analysis on sequential and delegating decisions closely
relates the present paper to the literature on commitment, since both these
strategies may imply the adoption of a commitment for strategic purposes.6
In particular, firms which move first acting as Stackelberg leaders in a quan-
4 In the model, firms have to choose to behave as price or quantity setters, to move early
or later and, finally, to act as managerial or entrepreneurial firms.
5As well-known in the literature on sequential games and symmetric firms, when price
competition is assumed, a second-mover advantage occurs due to the followers’ ability to
undercut the price set by the leaders. See Gal-Or (1985) and Amir and Stepanova (2006) for
a discussion.
6The economic literature on commitment (Dixit and Nalebuﬀ, 1991; Shelling, 1960) con-
siders a number of ways through which a firm can bind itself to strategic credible actions.
Within this body of literature it is shown how credibility can be established, among other
ways, by engaging first mover strategies or by delegating decisions.
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tity competition framework, gain a timing advantage by committing to actions
that limits bargaining with late-movers.7 In the same way, the owners in a
delegation quantity model, through an irrevocable mandate to their managers,
commit to an output prior to the profit-maximizer rivals, thus achieving market
leadership.8
Using linear demand and cost functions, in this paper we find that the sub-
game perfect equilibrium of the ME quantity (price) model entails output (price)
levels which coincide with those at the equilibrium of the correspondent LF
model only when one manager and one leader are assumed to operate in the
market, regardless of the number of followers and entrepreneurial firms and of
the degree of product substitutability. However, the strategy space is shown
to be determinant in defining the diﬀerences between the models’ outcomes in
the presence of a higher number of leaders or managerial firms. The analysis
of inter-group and intra-group competition and the inspection of the welfare
properties of the two games reveal that in a quantity competition framework
social welfare is higher under strategic delegation rather than with sequential
moves, while it is higher under sequential actions when price competition is
assumed. The paper also compares the welfare properties of the Stackelberg
and the incentive equilibria,9 following changes in market structure and in the
degree of product substitutability, and explicitly studies the interplay between
these two key elements. We find that in both models, heterogeneity in the pop-
ulation of firms has a diﬀerent impact on social welfare depending on whether
firms compete in quantities or prices. Under quantity competition, firms’ het-
erogeneity sustains a more aggressive behavior with respect to the rivals by the
managerial or the leader firms which act as high producing firms and contribute
positively to welfare. While the positive eﬀect on welfare of a larger number
of managerial firms always overcome the negative eﬀect of a stronger competi-
tion which reduces their aggressiveness, an increasing number of leaders leads to
welfare improvements provided that their number is low enough - i.e. the eﬀect
of competition among leaders is limited. Conversely, a market structure with
a homogeneous population of profit-maximizers guarantees the highest welfare
in both the models with price competition. Indeed, the existence of heteroge-
neous firms, i.e. managerial firms or firms moving sequentially, give scope to
soften competition and generate welfare losses with respect to the symmetric
cases. In each of the examined framework, product substitutability influences
the overall welfare, by altering the strength of both inter-group and intra-group
competition.
Our results are derived and discussed as follows. In Section 2 we solve the
basic ME model in the two set-ups of quantity and price competition. The same
procedure is applied in Section 3 for the LF model. Section 4 discusses the main
results and presents a comparison across the models. The last section concludes.
7See Gal-Or (1985) as a seminal contribution to the literature on first/second-mover ad-
vantages.
8 See Etro (2007) for a recent overview on market leadership theories in oligopoly.
9We refer to the equilibrium under strategic delegation as the incentive equilibrium.
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2 The Managerial-Entrepreneurial (ME) model
We start by examining both quantity and price competition in a market with
n firms (n ≥ 2), m of which are delegating firms (with 0 ≤ m ≤ n) allowing
for revenues’ maximization, and the other n−m firms are entrepreneurial.10 A
two-stage game catches the two dimensions of competition for the managerial
firms - competition in the delegation schemes and product market competition -
and runs as follows: in the first stage the delegating owners choose the extent of
control to delegate to their managers, namely the optimal compensation scheme,
while in the second stage both the non-managerial owners and the delegated
managers are in charge of quantity or price decisions.
Product diﬀerentiation is introduced in the model by using the linear demand
function of Shubik and Levitan (1980), as in Vives (1985), defined in the form
of an inverse demand function by:
pz = v −
1
1 + µ
Ã
nqz + µ
Ã nX
z=1
qz
!!
which allows for imperfect substitute goods.11 The parameter µ ∈ (0,+∞)
represents the degree of product substitutability: when µ = 0 products are
completely independent, while they are perfectly substitutable when µ→ +∞.
We also assume that firms are symmetric with respect to costs; marginal costs
are assumed to be constant and equal to c (with c 6= 0) and fixed costs are null.
The parameter v is the intercept of the inverse demand function.
2.1 The quantity game between managerial and entrepre-
neurial firms
Let us consider the game with quantity-setting firms and solve it by backwards.
At the second stage, the m managerial firms and the n−m entrepreneurial firms
compete on the final market choosing quantities simultaneously. Denote with
qi (i = 1, ..,m) the individual quantity produced by the generic managerial firm
i and with qk (k = m+ 1, .., n) the quantity set by the generic entrepreneurial
firm k.
Each manager maximizes the linear combination of profits and revenues
Mi = θiπi + (1− θi)Si,12 where (1− θi), (i = 1, ...,m), defines the weight
assigned by the owner to revenues Si, namely the incentive parameter. By
10According to this parameterization, we are able to describe competition in a wide range
of market structures by simply assuming that m varies, keeping constant the total number of
firms n. The number m of managerial firms can be also interpreted as a measure of market
asymmetry, the highest being m = n/2.
11This demand function comes from the quadratic utility function of a representative con-
sumer with quasi-linear preferences and is such that market size does not vary either with the
degree of substitutability or the number of varieties.
12Fershtman and Judd (1987) use the same function as managerial objective, while in Vickers
(1985) the managerial objective function is defined as a linear combination of firms’ profits and
sales. As shown in Lambertini and Trombetta (2002), the two formulations are equivalent.
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summing the First Order Conditions (FOCs) calculated with respect to qi over
the m managerial firms, we get:
qim (2n+ µ) = (1 + µ)
Ã
mv −
mX
i=1
θic
!
− µmQ (1)
where Q is the total quantity produced in the market. Pure profit maxi-
mization with respect to qk leads to the following expression which nests the
FOCs of the n−m entrepreneurial firms:
qk (n−m) (2n+ µ) = (1 + µ) (n−m) (v − c)− µ (n−m)Q (2)
Since Q = qim + qk (n−m), from (1) and (2) we calculate the individual
quantities of the two kinds of firms as functions of θi and θj (j 6= i):
qi =
v(1+µ)((2n+µ)+µc(n−m)−ncθi(2+µ)+µc
P
j 6=i θj)
(2n+µ(1+n))(2n+µ)
qk = (v−c)(1+µ)(2n+µ)−µcm+µc
Pm
i=1 θi
(2n+µ(1+n))(2n+µ)
At the first stage the owners of the managerial firms, by anticipating quantity
competition at the last stage, compete with respect to the delegation parame-
ters, deciding simultaneously upon the incentive contract for their manager.
Profit maximization by the owner of firm i leads to the optimal delegation pa-
rameter for any given θj (j 6= i) which gives, under the symmetry condition,
the level of θMEqi chosen at equilibrium by each managerial firm:
θMEqi =
2cn3(2+µ)2+2µn2c(3µ+4)+2µ2nc(1+µ)+µ3cm(n−1)−µ2v(n−1)(2n+µ)
c(2n2(2+µ)((n+2)µ+2n)+µ2n(4+µ)+µ3m(n−1)+µ3)
where the subscript denotes the ME model in quantities.13 Note that 0 <
θMEqi ≤ 1 for any µ ≥ 0 and increases in this interval with m and n. When in
the limit the number of both the types of firms approaches infinity, the optimal
parameter approaches the upper bound 1, i.e. pure profit maximization arises
at equilibrium. Moreover, the negative sign of the derivative ∂θMEqi /∂µ < 0
(see Appendix A1 for a demonstration) shows that when product diﬀerenti-
ation decreases (µ increases) the optimal delegation parameter monotonically
decreases, starting from θMEqi = 1 when µ = 0 and tending to a positive value
which entails the highest degree of delegation when µ→ +∞, provided that the
cost parameter c is suﬃciently high as compared to the consumers’ reservation
price v.14 The previous discussion introduces the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The incentive to deviate from profit maximization is a decreas-
ing function of both the number of managerial firms and the number of entre-
preneurial firms. For any market structure, increasing product diﬀerentiation
13As shown in Appendix 2A, the Second Order Conditions (SOCs) for the existence of a
maximum are always satisfied.
14The marginal cost parameter c must be higher than c = (v (n− 1)) / (2n+m (n− 1)) for
the lower bound of θMEq to be positive. The latter tends to zero under perfect substitutability
when c = c.
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reduces the incentive to delegate and induces firms to move closer to profit-
maximization.
The intuition for the above results is straightforward. Delegation is used in
the quantity competition case as a device to gain an advantage over rivals by
allowing managers to expand the output and induce a reduction of the competi-
tors’ quantities. The eﬀectiveness of this strategy in generating this beneficial
reply is dampened, due to strategic substitutability at both stages of the game,
by an intense rivalry on the compensation schemes caused by an increase in the
number of managerial firms or by an increase in the number of entrepreneurial
firms which softens the aggressiveness of the delegating rivals. The eﬀectiveness
of delegation as a strategic device is also aﬀected by increasing product diﬀeren-
tiation which reduces the advantages of managerial firms over rivals and limits
their need of being aggressive through delegation.
The values of the relevant market variables evaluated at the Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) are obtained by substitution and listed in Table 1a.
The key results are summarized in the following prospect where πMEqi and π
MEq
k
denote the profits gained by the managerial and the entrepreneurial firms, while
CSMEq and WMEq denote respectively consumers’ surplus and social welfare:
• qMEqi > qMEqk and πMEqi > πMEqk , for any m ∈ (0, n) and any given
µ ∈ (0,+∞);
• ∂q
MEq
i
∂m < 0,
∂qMEqk
∂m < 0;
∂(qMEqi −q
MEq
k )
∂m < 0;
∂πMEqi
∂m < 0,
∂πMEqi
∂m < 0;
∂(πMEqi −π
MEq
k )
∂m < 0;
∂CSMEq
∂m > 0;
∂WMEq
∂m > 0;
• ∂(q
MEq
i −q
MEq
k )
∂µ > 0,
∂(πMEqi −π
MEq
i )
∂µ > 0;
∂CSMEq
∂µ > 0;
∂WMEq
∂µ > 0.
15
Basically, our results show that the managerial firms have a competitive
advantage over the profit-maximizers, for any market structure and any degree
of product substitutability. The advantages from delegation, as the incentive to
delegate, decrease with the number of managerial firms (both quantity and profit
diﬀerentials decrease in m). The non-delegating firms also suﬀer from a larger
presence of delegating firms, whose interactions enhance overall competitive
pressure in the market. In any case, the presence of an increasing number of
managerial firms is welfare improving for any degree of product substitutability,
since the positive contribution to welfare of a higher number of such aggressive
firms always dominates the welfare losses due to their reduced aggressiveness.
In this situation m∗ = n turns out to be the optimal market structure.
As far as product diﬀerentiation is concerned, we find that the quantities
qMEqi and q
MEq
k coincide when µ = 0, since in this case firms act as local
monopolists in their respective markets and produce the quantity (v − c) /2n,
15The derivation of all these comparative results are available from the author upon request.
Consumer welfare has been obtained using the following expression calculated at the optimal
quantities: CS = (n(m(qi)
2+(n−m)(qk)2)+µ(m(qi)+(n−m)(qk))2)
2(1+µ) .
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while they diverge progressively when µ increases, the diﬀerence being maximum
when µ → +∞. Our results indeed show that product diﬀerentiation on the
one hand weakens the overall market competition raising firms’ mark-up; on
the other hand, by pushing managerial firms towards profit maximization and
shifting sales from the delegating to the non-delegating firms, it reduces the
extent of the managerial firms’ advantage and thus the eﬀects of firms’ disparities
(both quantity and profit diﬀerentials increase in µ). The net result is an overall
detrimental eﬀect on welfare which, however, leaves unchanged the optimal
market structure. The pattern of social welfare is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Social welfare in the ME quantity model (n = 10).
2.2 The price game between managerial and entrepre-
neurial firms
We turn now to solve the game when delegating and non-delegating firms engage
price competition. Let pi (i = 1, ..,m) be the price set by each managerial firm
i and pk (k = m+ 1, .., n) the price set by the entrepreneurial firm k.
By using the direct demand function à la Shubik and Levitan, we write the
managers’ objective function as a function of prices:
Mi = θiπi + (1− θi)Si = (pi − θic)
µv − pi (1 + µ) + µn (pi + P−i)
n
¶
(3)
where P−i is the sum of the prices set by all firms with the exception of firm
i’s.
At the second stage we solve the maximization problem of the function in (3)
with respect to pi. Summing the FOCs of the m managerial firms, we obtain:
pim (2n (1 + µ)− µ) = c
mX
i=1
θi (n (1 + µ)− µ) +m (nv + µP ) (4)
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where P is the sum of all prices.
By summing the FOCs of all the n−m profit-maximizing firms, we get:
pk (n−m) (2n (1 + µ)− µ) = c (n−m) (n (1 + µ)− µ) + (n−m) (nv + µP )
(5)
Since P = mpi + (n−m) pk, we are able to determine P from (4) and (5)
and get the prices of the managerial and the entrepreneurial firms as functions
of θi and θj (j 6= i):
pi =
n2(1+µ)(2v+µc)−nµ(v+cm)−µ2c(n+m(n−1))−c(µ−n(1+µ))(θin(2+µ)+
P
j 6=i θjµ)
(2n+µ(n−1))(2n+µ(2n−1))
pk =
2n2(1+µ)(v+c(1+µ))−nµ(v+c(m+3))−µ2c(n(m+3)−(m+1))−µc(µ−n(1+µ))(θi+
P
j 6=i θj)
(2n+µ(n−1))(2n+µ(2n−1))
Profit maximization at the incentive-setting stage yields the optimal dele-
gation parameter θMEpi (see Appendix A3 for its analytical expression), where
the subscript denotes the ME model in prices.16 It can be checked that when
µ ≥ 0 the optimal contract entails θMEpi ≥ 1 which implies that at equilibrium
managers are discouraged from putting some weight on sales and behave less
aggressively than in the presence of all profit-maximizing firms.17 Indeed, in
contrast to the quantity competition case, owners competing in prices motivate
their managers to keep prices beyond the profit maximization level, so that if all
firms delegated control to managers, the incentive-equilibrium would be more
favorable than the profit-maximizing equilibrium. The benefits from delegation
in this heterogenous environment also accrue to the non-delegating firms which
gain from operating in a less competitive market.
Our analysis also reveals that the parameter θMEpi increases in m and de-
creases in n, showing that when there is an increasing number of managerial
firms in the market, deviation from profit maximization is more likely and a
collusion-like outcome can be sustained. Conversely, managers are more mo-
tivated towards profit maximization when the number of entrepreneurial firms
increases since, for any givenm, the presence of a high number of non-delegating
firms reduces the ability of managerial firms to sustain a collusive outcome
through delegation. In the limit, when the number of both the types of firms
approaches infinity, θMEpi equals the lower bound 1, namely firms find it optimal
to maximize profits. Finally, we find that the impact of product diﬀerentiation
on the optimal delegation parameter is interestingly non-monotone.18 Indeed,
at the extremes of the interval (0,+∞) of the diﬀerentiation parameter θMEpi
tends to 1, implying pure profit-maximization under both the hypotheses of
independent markets and perfect substitutability.19 Within this interval we
16The second order conditions for a maximum are always satisfied (see Appendix A4 for a
formal proof).
17This compensation mechanism resembles the eﬀects of a tax imposed by the owners on
managers’ expenditure. See Fershtman and Judd (1987, p.13) for a discussion on this point.
18 See Appendix A3 for a formal proof.
19This is in contrast to the quantity competition case in which perfect substitutability entails
the highest deviation from profit maximization and is consistent with the idea that for µ = 0
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find ∂θMEpi /∂µ < 0 for suﬃciently high values of µ: product diﬀerentiation
widens the distortion from pure profit maximization when products are suﬃ-
ciently substitutable; however, a further decrease of it induces delegating firms
to move back towards profit maximization, entailing ∂θMEpi /∂µ < 0 when µ is
low enough.
The above discussion is synthesized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Deviation from profit maximization increases in the number of
managerial firms and decreases in the number of entrepreneurial firms. For any
given market structure, the managerial distortion from profit maximization is
non-monotone in µ, reaching its maximum for a positive, finite value of µ.
The solution for the relevant variables at the SPNE are reported in Table
1b. Again, we can summarize the main results as follows:
• pMEpi > pMEpk and πMEpi < πMEpk for any m ∈ (0, n) and any given
µ ∈ (0,+∞);
• ∂p
MEp
i
∂m > 0;
∂pMEpk
∂m > 0;
∂(pMEpi −p
MEp
k )
∂m > 0;
∂πMEpi
∂m > 0,
∂πMEpi
∂m > 0;
∂(πMEpk −π
MEp
i )
∂m > 0;
∂CSMEp
∂m < 0;
∂WMEp
∂m is negative over
(0, n) provided that µ is low enough, and exhibits a non-monotone pattern
for higher values of µ;
• ∂(p
MEp
i −p
MEp
k )
∂µ and
∂(πMEpk −π
MEp
i )
∂µ are non-monotone in µ, being positive
for low values of µ, and negative thereafter; ∂CSMEp∂µ > 0;
∂WMEp
∂µ > 0.20
Intuitively, by committing to a less aggressive conduct, managerial firms
keep high prices, beyond the profit maximization level, and relax the overall
competition, exerting a positive externality on those firms that maximize prof-
its in the same market. The higher prices and the output restriction mimic a
collusive outcome which leads the profits of all firms to increase. For any de-
gree of product substitutability and any market structure, the price managerial
game gives a competitive advantage to the entrepreneurial firms. Furthermore,
both the price and profit diﬀerentials increase in m, as well as the aggregate
profits, showing an increasing advantage in favour of the entrepreneurial firms
and an overall higher profitability for all firms when the number of manager-
ial firms increases. The model’s solutions also reveal that the presence of an
increasing number of managerial firms is always welfare detrimental, provided
that product substitutability is suﬃciently low. For higher values of µ, social
welfare is shown to rise when the managerial firms represent the largest share
of firms in the market, since in such circumstances the positive impact due to
the higher profits gained by all firms overcomes the negative eﬀect of a larger
market quantity contraction. Indeed, Figure 2 shows that the social welfare rises
the market outcomes of a price setting and a quantity setting model coincide, for any given
market structure.
20The derivation of these comparative results are available from the author upon request.
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when m and µ are high enough. Moreover, we find that the minimum number
of managerial firms needed to generate such a boost is decreasing in µ, since
increasing substitutability reduces the welfare detrimental eﬀects of delegation
and requires a progressively lower number of managerial firms for the positive
eﬀect of higher profits to prevail. The socially optimal market structure will
entail the presence of only entrepreneurial firms in the market (m∗ = 0).
With respect to changes in µ, it should be also remarked that the price and
profit diﬀerentials reflect the non-monotone pattern of the optimal delegation
parameter over the interval (0,+∞).21 When µ is high, its reduction allows
for a wider price diﬀerence which is achieved through higher delegation by the
managerial firms; this widens the extent of the entrepreneurial firms’ advan-
tage. When µ is low, all firms are isolated from competition and this induces
the owners of managerial firms to move towards pure profit maximization, as
they would behave in a monopoly context; this reduces price and profit dif-
ferentials. Analogously to the quantity competition case, increasing product
diﬀerentiation has a twofold impact on the market outcomes: besides softening
the overall competition, it may amplify or reduce, according to its initial value,
the firms’ disparities due to the diﬀerences of roles, so enhancing or shrinking
the advantage enjoyed by the profit maximizers. The second eﬀect is shown to
be negligible as compared to the first one, so that the overall welfare monoton-
ically decreases in µ, without altering the market structure required for social
optimality.
Figure 2: Social welfare in the ME price model (n = 10).
21The two prices coincide at the extremes of this interval, approaching the monopoly price
(v + c) /2 when µ = 0 and the marginal cost c when µ→ +∞.
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3 The Stackelberg model (LF model)
In this section we discuss the Stackelberg equilibria of a n-firm model with
diﬀerentiated product, in which m leaders and n − m followers compete in
quantities or in prices.22 Stackelberg models in which m leaders and n − m
followers compete in a homogeneous good market have been considered, among
others, by Daughety (1990), Huck et al (2001) and Ino-Matsumura (2009).23
Within this literature, the paper by Daughety (1990) is closely related to ours.
He models quantity competition in a homogenous product market and shows the
existence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between social welfare, measured
by the aggregate output, and the number of leaders. The welfare-maximizing
market structure is associated in the model with the highest asymmetry among
firms.
In this section the analysis underlying the Daughety’s work is extended to
embody product substitutability and price competition. We model sequential
interactions in a standard two-stage game in which multiple leaders move simul-
taneously and independently in the earlier stage, and multiple followers choose
their variables simultaneously and independently in the latest stage, given the
leaders’ choices.24 We retain the above assumptions on demand and costs, al-
lowing in this case for c ≥ 0.
3.1 The quantity game in sequential moves
Let qi (with i = 1, ..,m) and qk (with k = m + 1, .., n) denote respectively the
generic leader’s and the generic follower’s output. For any quantity chosen by
the leaders, each follower maximizes his profits with respect to qk. The solution
of the maximization problem for each follower at the second stage gives his
optimal quantity as a function of the aggregate leaders’ output QL:
qk (QL) = (v−c)(µ+1)−µQL2n+µ(1+n−m) (6)
At the first stage each leader i, by incorporating in his objective function
the best reply function in (6) for the n−m followers, maximizes his profits with
respect to qi. The following solution is obtained:
qLFqi =
(v−c)(µ+1)(µ+2n)
2n2(2+µ)+µ(µ(1+m)+4n)
so that at equilibrium:
qLFqk =
(v−c)(1+µ)((µ+2n)2+2nµ(n−m))
(2n2(µ+2)+µ(µm+4n)+µ2)(µ(n−m)+µ+2n)
22 In the LF model the number m of leaders is taken as a measure of market structure
asymmetry: m = 0 and m = n represent the symmetric cases which imply simultaneous
moves, while any m ∈ ]0, 1[ implies sequential moves.
23The Daughety’s analysis focuses on the welfare-enhancing character of horizontal mergers
in Stackelberg markets and is revisited by Ino-Matsumura (2009) under more general demand
and cost functions, while Huck et al (2001) deal with the profitability of mergers for any pair
of firms (leaders or followers).
24 Sequential interactions can be also modeled as a hierarchical Stackelberg game, namely a
multi-stage game in which firms choose their market variable sequentially at each stage. See
Okuguchi and Yamazaki (1994) and Pal and Sarkar (2002) as possible examples.
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These quantities coincide when µ = 0, collapsing to the quantities (v − c) /2n
produced in independent markets, and diverge progressively when µ increases.
Quantity diﬀerentials are maximum under perfect substitutability, case in which
the optimal quantities collapse to the solutions of the Stackelberg asymmetric
game found in Daughety (1990) and Huck et al (2001), qLFqi = v−c1+m and q
LFq
k =
v−c
(1+m)(n−m+1) .
25
An inspection of the SPNE outcomes (see Table 1c for the expression of
profits) reveals that qLFqi > q
LFq
k and π
LFq
i > π
LFq
k for any m in the open
interval (0, n) and any µ ∈ (0,+∞). Indeed, individual quantities produced
by the leaders are always higher than those of the followers, for any degree
of product substitutability and any market structure; higher profits accrue to
leaders as a result of their higher sales.
Let us now investigate the way in which the equilibrium is aﬀected by changes
in the parametersm and µ. The analysis of the role of market structure on firms’
output and profits is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 For any given µ, as the number of leaders m increases over
the interval (0, n), there is a first interval (0, em1) in which the total produc-
tion of both leaders and followers increases in m, leading to ∂QLFq/∂m > 0,
and profits are such that ∂πLFqi /∂m < 0 and ∂π
LFq
k /∂m < 0. In the sec-
ond interval (em1,m1), ∂πLFqi /∂m < 0 and ∂πLFqk /∂m > 0, while in the third
interval (m1, n), ∂πLFqi /∂m > 0 and ∂π
LFq
k /∂m > 0: in these two subsets
∂QLFq/∂m < 0.
A proof is provided in Appendix A5.
For any given µ, our results show an inverse U-shaped behavior of Q over
the interval (0, n) that can be explained as follows. The higher production by
leaders pushes towards a lower production by followers which are induced to be
accommodating due to strategic substitutability of quantities. The eﬀectiveness
of such an aggressive strategy in increasing the leader’s profits, namely their
commitment power, depends on the competitive pressure among leaders - the
tougher the competition among leaders, the weaker their ability to implement
aggressive and profitable strategies. Overall, two eﬀects of an increase of m on
total quantity and welfare can be identified: a positive eﬀect due to the presence
of more leaders which contributes to a greater output expansion and to lower
prices; a negative eﬀect associated with the increased competition among leaders
which reduces overall production and raises prices. The first eﬀect prevails when
m ∈ (0, em1). Indeed, when m is low, competition among leaders is still soft, so
that an increasing number of leaders contributes significantly to raising market
quantity, notwithstanding the negative eﬀect of a decreasing followers’ output.
Profits enjoyed by both leaders and followers will decrease as a consequence of
the decreasing individual quantities. In contrast, the second eﬀect prevails in
the two intervals (em1,m1) and (m1, n) where the followers’ output reduction is
25This quantity game with sequential moves collapses to a standard Cournot model with
diﬀerentiated products when m = 0 (all firms are ’followers’) or m = n (all firms are ’leaders’).
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not oﬀset anymore by the progressively slighter output expansion by the leaders.
The consequence is a reduction of the aggregate output in these intervals. Notice
that only in the third interval (m1, n) the profits of both leaders and followers
increase, since a more significant market quantity reduction enables all firms to
benefit from higher prices.
Moreover, we show that the way in which market structure aﬀects social
welfare is more articulated in the presence of product diﬀerentiation as compared
to a homogeneous product market. By considering for analytical tractability the
aggregate quantity behavior as a proxy of the correspondent welfare behavior,
we find that with respect to the Daughety’s result imperfect substitutability
reduces the degree of market asymmetry required for social optimality. Indeed,
we find em1 (µ) ≥ n/2 for µ ∈ ]0,+∞],26 i.e. welfare is maximized in the
presence of a higher number of leaders. Decreasing values of µ, for any given m,
reduce market quantity and social welfare, raising the profits of both leaders and
followers. More interestingly, we find ∂ em1/∂µ < 0 when µ > 2n, which shows
that increasing product diﬀerentiation makes the critical value em1 to increase,
provided that µ is high enough. When µ < 2n, diﬀerentiation progressively
lowers em1. As shown in Figure 3 in which the social welfare function is plotted,
this non-monotone pattern of em1 is mirrored in a non-monotone behavior of
welfare with respect to changes of µ.
This analysis is synthesized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 As long as substitutability among goods is high enough (µ >
2n), increasing product diﬀerentiation widens the interval (0, em1) in which over-
all quantity and welfare increase in the number of leaders. When products be-
come less alike (µ < 2n), increasing diﬀerentiation shrinks the interval (0, em1).
Product diﬀerentiation alters the socially optimal market structure accordingly
to these changes.
The non-monotone relationship between the parameter µ and em1 is crucial
in explaining the role of product diﬀerentiation on the socially optimal market
structure. In this regard, we argue that increased product diﬀerentiation on the
one hand softens competition among leaders, limiting the loss of commitment
power associated with an increase in m; on the other hand, it creates market
niches and reduces the incentives for leaders to behave aggressively, thus re-
ducing the eﬀects of diﬀerences between leaders and followers.27 Indeed, when
firms’ products are close substitutes (µ high) the diﬀerences of roles are still
relevant, so that the main channel through which µ aﬀects the optimal market
structure is the competition-among-leaders eﬀect - as µ decreases the optimal
number of leaders progressively increases. Conversely, when substitutability is
very low, the main eﬀect of a further decrease in µ is that related to the reduc-
tion of the diﬀerences of roles - the optimal number of leaders decreases. The
26The optimal market structure em1 collapses to n/2 when µ→ +∞, as found by Daughety.
27As in the quantity LF model, the sign of the derivative ∂
³
qMEqi − q
MEq
k
´
/∂µ is al-
ways positive, showing that product diﬀerentiation reduces monotonically the eﬀects of firms’
diﬀerences in a quantity model.
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diﬀerences of roles become irrelevant when µ = 0: in this case all the agents act
as local monopolists and the critical value em1 is undetermined, clearly showing
that when markets are completely independent, welfare does not depend on the
relative number of leaders and followers.
Figure 3: Social welfare in the LF quantity model (n = 10).
3.2 The price game in sequential moves
The above leader-follower game is now examined under the hypothesis of price
competition. By solving the profit maximization problem of a generic follower
k , we obtain the following optimal choice as a function of any price set by the
first-movers:
pk (PL) = n(v+c)+cµ(n−1)+µPLn(µ+2)+µ(m−1) (7)
where PL is the sum of prices set by leaders at the first stage.
At the first stage each leader, by taking into account the best reply function
in (7) for the n−m followers, sets the following profit-maximizing price:
pLFpi =
2n2(v+c)+µnv(2n−1)+µnc(4n−3)+µ2c(2n(n−2)+m+1)
2µn(3n−2)+µ2(2n(n−2)+m+1)+4n2
By substituting the latter in (7), we get the optimal price of each follower:
pLFpk =
v((2n3+(2m−4)n2+n)µ2+(6n3+(2m−4)n2)µ+4n3)
4n2µ(4n−3+m)+2µ2n(n(5n−9)+m(3n−1)+3)+µ3(2n(n−2)+m+1)(m+n−1)+8n3+
c((n(2n(n−3)+(2n−3)m+5)+m2−1)µ3+(2n2(4n−7)+2nm(2n−1)+5n)µ2+(10n3+(2m−8)n2)µ+4n3)
4n2µ(4n−3+m)+2µ2n(n(5n−9)+m(3n−1)+3)+µ3(2n(n−2)+m+1)(m+n−1)+8n3
It is easy to check that these prices coincide at the extremes of the interval
(0,+∞) in which µ lies, and collapse to the marginal cost c when µ→ +∞ and
to the monopoly price (v + c) /2 when µ = 0.
It can be also checked that pLFpi > p
LFp
k and π
LFp
i < π
LFp
k , for any m
in the open interval (0, n) and any µ ∈ (0,+∞) (the equilibrium profits are
reported in Table 1d). Indeed, followers are able to undercut the leaders’ price
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and gain larger market shares, thus achieving a competitive advantage over the
first-movers.28
The impact on profits and welfare of changes in market structure is outlined
in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 For any given µ, as the number of leaders m increases over
the interval (0, n), there is a first interval (0, em2) in which ∂QLFp/∂m < 0,
and profits are such that ∂πLFpi /∂m > 0 and ∂π
LFp
k /∂m > 0. In a second
interval (em2,m2), ∂πLFpi /∂m > 0 and ∂πLFpk /∂m < 0, while in the third in-
terval (m2, n), ∂πLFpi /∂m < 0 and ∂π
LFp
k /∂m < 0. In the latter two subsets
∂QLFp/∂m > 0.
A proof is provided in Appendix A6.
Our results show a U-shaped relationship between m and welfare, when
the latter is approximated by total market quantity. In order to explain this
pattern, it can be noticed that the price game with sequential moves collapses
to a Bertrand diﬀerentiated model when m = 0 or m = n. Contrary to the
quantity game, these symmetric solutions represent the socially optimal market
structures of the model. In a price game the presence of one or more first-
movers reduces the aggressiveness of the other firms and hence the overall market
competitiveness. Starting from m = 0, the eﬀect on welfare of a progressive
increase in m is indeed twofold. On the one hand, the number of high-pricing
firms increases - with an obvious negative eﬀect on welfare; on the other hand
a tougher competition among leaders emerges, which lowers their prices and
induces, due to strategic complementarity, a followers’ reaction in the same
direction. The net eﬀect on welfare is negative in the interval (0, em2) - in which
the number of leaders is not high enough to ensure that competition among
them enhances welfare significantly - and is positive otherwise. Indeed, welfare
is minimized in em2 < n/2 for µ ∈ ]0,+∞[: a marginal increase in the number
of leaders turns to generate overall welfare improvements before their number
has reached that of the followers.
The overall eﬀect of product substitutability in this game is stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 6 The introduction of imperfect substitutability does not aﬀect the
socially optimal market structures m∗ = 0 and m∗ = n. Increasing product dif-
ferentiation widens the interval (0, em2) in which the overall quantity and welfare
decrease in m, altering accordingly the welfare-minimizing market structure.
Indeed, increasing product diﬀerentiation progressively causes the critical
value em2 to increase, since ∂ em2/∂µ < 0 for µ ∈ ]0,+∞[. The intuition is
that, as products become less substitutable, price competition becomes less
28The issue of price leadership in duopolistic markets has been extensively investigated in
the literature. See Amir and Stepanova (2006) for a generalization of the main results in
Bertrand markets.
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hard and the price-competition-among-leaders eﬀect dominates the leader-high-
price eﬀect for a higher number of leaders. This negative relationship between
µ and em2 is shown in Figure 4 where the social welfare function is plotted.
As remarked in the quantity competition case, imperfect product substi-
tutability aﬀects welfare both directly - through an increase in the equilibrium
mark-ups - and by influencing the relative behavior of the two types of firms. As
for this latter channel, imperfect product substitutability widens the scope for
leaders to set higher prices, but at the same time makes firms more independent
from each other. While the first eﬀect amplifies the diﬀerences associated with
the roles played by firms on the market, the second dampens these diﬀerences.
The first eﬀect prevails when the products are still close substitutes, the second
when µ is suﬃciently low.29 However, in the analysis of the welfare properties
of market structure, the nature of price competition is such that the eﬀect of
changes of µ on the diﬀerences of roles is negligible as compared to its impact on
the competition-among-leaders eﬀect, so that an increasingly higher number of
leaders causes welfare improvements when µ decreases. It can be noticed that ;
no diﬀerences between leaders or followers are observable in the two limit cases
µ = 0 or µ = +∞, since all the agents act respectively as local monopolists or
as firms pricing at marginal cost. In these latter cases, the critical value em2 is
undetermined, clearly showing that when markets are completely independent,
or when they are perfectly competitive, welfare does not depend on the number
of leaders over followers.
Figure 4: Social welfare in the LF price model (n = 10).
29As in the ME price model, the impact of product substitutability on the eﬀects of role
diﬀerences is captured by the derivative ∂
³
pMEpi − p
MEp
k
´
/∂µ which is non-monotone in µ,
being positive for low values of µ and negative thereafter.
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4 Discussion
4.1 The main results
In this section we summarize the main results of the previous sections and high-
light the diﬀerent impact of market structure on the market outcomes of the
ME and the LF models. The analysis developed in the quantity ME model has
revealed that an increasing number of managerial firms causes the aggregate
output and welfare to increase for any degree of product substitutability, so
that the socially optimal market structure requires all firms to be managerial.
This result is consistent with the fact that a quantity ME game collapses to a
simultaneous Cournot model when all firms are entrepreneurial and converges
monotonically to a welfare-enhancing market structure when all firms are man-
agerial. Conversely, the inspection of a ME price game has shown that the
presence of an increasing number of managerial firms favours collusive behav-
ior and, for any market structure, has an adverse eﬀect on welfare provided
that product substitutability is low enough. For a higher degree of the latter,
the presence of a suﬃciently large number of managerial firms is responsible
of limiting the negative eﬀects of the collusive attitude, contributing positively
to social welfare through the profit channel. In any case, the socially optimal
market structure requires all firms to be entrepreneurial and to play a standard
simultaneous Bertrand game.
Let us now discuss the results of the LF model. In the quantity competition
case, we find that heterogeneity among firms, which implies sequential moves
in this model, always yields higher welfare than in a model with simultaneous
moves. As a result, social optimality requires a significant degree of asymmetry
among firms. As far as price competition in sequential games is concerned, we
have shown that the socially optimal market structures entail perfect symmetry
among firms, so that any heterogeneity in roles causes a detrimental eﬀect on
welfare. Clearly, in both these settings, welfare varies non-monotonically with
the number of leaders, since it depends on the degree of market asymmetry which
determines the intensity of competition between and within the groups of leaders
and followers. A fiercer competition among leaders induced by their increasing
number, is shown to enhance welfare provided that: a) their number is not too
high in the quantity model, that is when the toughness of competition among
leaders does not reduce significantly their beneficial aggressiveness; b) their
number is suﬃciently high in a price model, so that the beneficial competition
among leaders can compensate the welfare losses due to the sequentiality of
moves.
4.2 The ME model and the LF model: a comparison
A comparison between the market outcomes of the ME and the LF models re-
veals that, for any mode of competition and any given total number of firms,
the two games produce the same outcome when there is only one delegating
firm on the market. This outcome entails identical market variables set by the
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managerial firm and the first-mover on the one hand, and by followers and entre-
preneurial firms on the other hand. Indeed, the only managerial firm assumes,
in the presence of quantity competition, the role of a Stackelberg leader for any
µ ∈ ]0,+∞] and, in the presence of price competition, the less favorable sta-
tus of a first-mover in a sequential game, for any µ ∈ ]0,+∞[. Observationally
equivalent market outcomes derive from an equivalent strategic behavior of each
leading firm which faces competition by firms identical with respect to motives
and timing. In the same intervals of the substitutability parameter, diﬀerences
between the two models, resulting in diﬀerent profitability and welfare condi-
tions, arise when the number of delegating/leader firms increases. The presence
of a higher number of firms playing at the first stage of each game is decisive
in determining the diﬀerent results in the two games, since it is the introduc-
tion of competition among these firms that modifies rivalry between and within
the groups of firms in the two game structures, and consequently the strategic
behavior of the leading firms.
A comparison between the two models for any given mode of competition, re-
veals that quantity competition between the managerial and the entrepreneurial
firms leads to more competitive and eﬃcient market outcomes than competition
between leaders and followers. Conversely, under price competition, more de-
sirable welfare properties are associated with interactions in a sequential model
rather than in a delegation model. Moreover, in a quantity competition frame-
work, the commitment advantage of leaders is always higher than the advantage
gained in an equally structured market by firms which commit to delegation.
However, a comparison of profits gained by the most successful firms under price
competition shows that, for any market structure, the entrepreneurial firms gain
more than the late-movers, thus suggesting that a managerial model gives scope
for higher advantages to the leading firms. By comparing the models with re-
spect to the mode of competition, we finally find that quantity setting behavior
turns out to be always more profitable than price setting, whatever the role
played by firms and for any degree of product substitutability. The opposite
conclusion applies as far as welfare is concerned: social welfare is indeed found to
be always higher in any price setting as compared to the corresponding quantity
setting.
The overall discussion allows us to rank welfare according to the following
relationship:
WLFp ≥WMEp > WMEq ≥WLFq
The implications associated with the LF models nest those obtained by Boyer
and Moreaux (1987) in a duopoly framework with product diﬀerentiation. By
examining the equilibria in simultaneous or sequential actions under both quan-
tity and price competition, and ranking correspondingly social welfare, they
basically find that the Bertrand simultaneous equilibrium dominates in terms
of higher welfare the Stackelberg equilibrium in prices which, in turn, domi-
nates the Stackelberg quantity equilibrium which finally dominates the Cournot
equilibrium. Our analysis, indeed, extends these results, showing that, for any
considered oligopolistic market structure, sequential actions are welfare enhanc-
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ing with respect to simultaneous moves under quantity competition and are
welfare detrimental under price competition.
By comparing the ME and the LF models, we finally want to focus on the
impact of product substitutability on the outcomes of the two games, under-
lying the analogous properties they exhibit when firms compete in the same
strategy space. Indeed, and as already pointed out throughout the paper, in-
creasing product diﬀerentiation reduces welfare in each set-up by also aﬀecting
the firms’ relative positions on the market. On the one hand, the analysis of
the quantity competition models reveals that increasing product diﬀerentiation
progressively reduces the eﬀects of behavioral heterogeneity between leaders and
followers (or between managerial and entrepreneurial firms) and contributes to
a lower degree of competition which is welfare-reducing. On the other hand,
in each price competition model the possibility for heterogeneous firms to set
through product diﬀerentiation diﬀerent prices with respect to the perfect sub-
stitutability case, makes relevant their behavioral diﬀerences which contribute
to softening competition and impacting negatively welfare.
5 Conclusions
In this paper oligopolistic competition among heterogeneous producers of dif-
ferentiated products has been modeled in the two frameworks of strategic del-
egation and sequential competition. Besides providing the conditions for an
equivalence result to hold under both quantity and price competition, the pa-
per has clarified the circumstances under which delegation and timing strategies
contribute to firms’ profitability by inducing pro-competitive or anti-competitive
rivals’ reactions. For any mode of competition, our analysis has shed light on
the market forces enhancing or reducing competition within and between two
groups of diﬀerent firms in each model, providing a welfare ranking which cap-
tures the impact of firms’ heterogeneity. By exploring the eﬀects of changes in
market structure and the role of product substitutability in altering the diﬀer-
ences among any given number of mixed firms, this paper has drawn attention
to the role of behavioral heterogeneity among technologically identical firms in
pursuing individually and mutually beneficial objectives. Useful implications for
market policies, such as merger control and measures against dominant position,
can be derived from the presented welfare analysis.
Finally the paper, by discussing delegation and first mover strategies as
possible sources of commitment power, sheds light on the determinants of the
degree of market power gained through diﬀerent commitments and thus provides
a measure of firms’ comparative advantages on the market. Along this research
line, the paper addresses a point raised by Schelling (1960), according to which
"a commitment is beneficial for a player who is the only one able to make a
commitment". This conclusion applies to the analysis of duopolistic competi-
tion centered around the advantages gained from the unilateral adoption of a
commitment, and on the coordination problem that may prevent firms from ben-
efiting from it. The analysis of oligopolistic interactions presented throughout
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this paper allows us to assess the profitability of delegation or timing strate-
gies under more general assumptions on market structure, when the latter is
viewed as the result of the exogenous adoption of those commitments. We leave
the analysis of the complex interactions under the hypothesis of endogenous
commitment choice as a topic for future research.
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Table 1
a) SPNE outcomes in the ME quantity model
The optimal quantities of respectively managerial and entrepreneurial firms:
qMEqi =
n(v−c)(1+µ)(2+µ)(2n+µ)
8n2(n(µ+1)+µ)+2nµ2(n(n+2)+2)+µ3(n+m(n−1)+1)
qMEqk =
(v−c)(1+µ)(2n2(2+µ)+µ(2n+µ))
8n2(n(µ+1)+µ)+2nµ2(n(n+2)+2)+µ3(n+m(n−1)+1)
The optimal firms’ profits:
πMEqi =
n(v−c)2(µ+2n)2(1+µ)(2+µ)(n2(µ+2)+µ(2n+µ))
(8n2µ(n+1)+2µ2n(n2+2n+2)+µ3(n+m(n−1)+1)+8n3)2
πMEqk =
(v−c)2(µ+n)(1+µ)(2n2(µ+2)+µ(2n+µ))
2
(8n2µ(n+1)+2µ2n(n2+2n+2)+µ3(n+m(n−1)+1)+8n3)2
b) SPNE outcomes in the ME price model
The optimal prices of managerial and entrepreneurial firms: :
pMEpi =
4n3(v+c)+2µn2v(3n−1)+µ2n2v(2n−1)+µc(2n2(5n−3)+n2µ(8n−11)+4µn+µ2(n−1)(2n(n−1)−m+1))
8n2µ(2n−1)+2nµ2(n(5n−6)+2)+µ3(n−1)(2n(n−1)−m+1)+8n3
pMEpk =
4n3(v+c)+2µn2v(3n−1)+µ2nv(2n(n−1)+1)+µc(2n2(5n−3)+2n2µ(4n−5)+3µn+µ2(n−1)(2n(n−1)−m+1))
8n2µ(2n−1)+2nµ2(n(5n−6)+2)+µ3(n−1)(2n(n−1)−m+1)+8n3
The optimal firms’ profits:
πMEpi =
n(v−c)2(µ+2)(2n(µ+1)−µ)2(nµ2(n−2)+nµ(3n−2)+µ2+2n2)
((µ+1)(µ+2)(2n3(µ+2)−4µn2)+µ2(4n+µ(3n−1))−µ3m(n−1))2
πMEpk =
(v−c)2(µ(n−1)+n)(2n2(µ+2)(µ+1)−µ(2n(µ+1)−µ))
2
((µ+1)(µ+2)(2n3(µ+2)−4µn2)+µ2(4n+µ(3n−1))−µ3m(n−1))2
c) Profits of leaders and followers in the LF quantity model
πLFqi =
(v−c)2(1+µ)(µ+2n)2(µn(n−m+3)+µ2+2n2)
(n(µ+2)−µ(m−1))(2n(n(µ+2)+2µ)+µ2(1+m))2
πLFqk =
(v−c)2(1+µ)(µ+n)(2µn(n−m+2)+µ2+4n2)
2
(n(µ+2)−µ(m−1))2(2n(n(µ+2)+2µ)+µ2(1+m))2
d) Profits of leaders and followers in the LF price model
πLFpi =
(v−c)2(2n(1+µ)−µ)2(n2(µ+2)(1+µ)−nµ2(3−m)+µ(µ+nm)−3µn)
(n(µ+2)−µ(1−m))(2n(µ+1)(µn−2µ+2n)+µ2(1+m))2
πLFpk =
(v−c)2(n(µ+1)−µ)(2n(µ+1)(n(µ+2)+µm)−µ(4n(µ+1)−µ))2
(n(µ+2)−µ(1−m))2(2n(µ+1)(µn−2µ+2n)+µ2(1+m))2
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Appendix
A1 Proof of the negative sign of the derivative ∂θMEqi /∂µ.
By calculating
∂θMEq
∂µ we obtain that
∂θMEq
∂µ < 0 when:
m < 8n
3(µ+2)+n2µ(8µ+µ2+20)+µ2(µn+8n+µ)
µ3(n−1) = m
where m > n. This condition is always met in our model in which m ≤ n.
A2 The SOCs at the delegation stage of a ME quantity game
The second order conditions require the following second derivative with
respect to θi to be always negative:
∂2πMEqi
∂θ2i
= − (1+µ)2nc
2(n2(µ+2)2+2µ2(n+1)+µ(µ2+4n))
((2n+µ(1+n)))2(2n+µ)2
Clearly, the condition is always satisfied in our model.
A3 Proof of the non-monotone pattern of the derivative
∂θMEpi /∂µ.
The optimal delegation parameter of the delegation game in prices is:
θMEpi =
2n4cµ(µ+3)(µ(µ+3)+4)−µ2(n−1)(+µcm(µ(n−1)+n)−nv(µ(2n−1)+2n))
c(2n3(µ+1)(µ+2)2−µ3(n(4n−3)+1)−4µn(µ(3n−1)+2n)−µ3m(n−1))(n+µ(n−1))
+
+ 2µ
2nc(µ(11n−3)+7n)+µ4c(n(7n−4)+1)+8n4c−2µn3c(3µ+8)(µ+1)2
c(2n3(µ+1)(µ+2)2−µ3(n(4n−3)+1)−4µn(µ(3n−1)+2n)−µ3m(n−1))(n+µ(n−1))
The derivative ∂θ
MEp
i
∂µ is shown to be negative when m < m, where:
m = 2n
4(µ+1)(2n(µ+1)(µ+2)(µ(µ−2)−4)−µ(µ2(7µ+5)−28(1+µ)))
µ3(n−1)(2n2(µ+1)2−nµ(3µ+4)+µ2)
+
+4n
3µ4(5µ+7)−2n3µ2(11µ+16)−µ3n2(µ(15µ+16)−2)+2µ4n(2+3µ)−µ5
µ3(n−1)(2n2(µ+1)2−nµ(3µ+4)+µ2)
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As shown in the figure below where m is described with n = 2, n = 3, n = 4
and n = 10 (and where it is also assumed v = 1 and c = 12), this threshold
level of m increases in µ and n, converging asymptotically to the positive value
2n2 − 2n+ 1 when µ→ +∞.
Figure 5: The threshold values m (µ) as functions of diﬀerent values of n.
The functions m (2) and m (3) and the lines for n = 2 and n = 3 are drawn
in the following figure:
Figure 6: The set of values of m consistent with ∂θMEpi /∂µ < 0 when n = 2
and n = 3.
It can be noticed that the condition for the negativity of ∂θ
MEp
i
∂µ is met in
our model when m < m < n, that is for all the values m in the areas below
each curve and the correspondent line n (the shadow areas in Figure 6). These
values are clearly associated with the highest degree of product substitutability.
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A4 The SOCs at the delegation stage of a ME price game
The second order conditions require the following second derivative with
respect to θi to be always negative:
∂2πMEpi
∂θ2i
= −2c
2(2+µ)(µ2+2n2+nµ(3n−2)+nµ2(n−2))(n+µ(n−1))2
n(2n+µ(n−1))2(2n(1+µ)−µ)2
which is always met in our model.
A5 Proof of proposition 3
By considering the leaders’ profits, we find that ∂π
LFq
i
∂m > 0 when
m1 < m < m2,
where m1 = A−
√
B
4µn and m2 =
A+
√
B
4µn
with A = 4n2 (µ+ 2) + µ (3µ+ 10n)
and B =
¡
µ (9µ+ 16n) + 8n2 (µ+ 2)
¢
(2n+ µ)2.
Since m2 > n, we conclude that the profits of each leader increase in m over
the interval (m1, n).
As regards the followers’ profits, we find that ∂π
LFq
k
∂m > 0 whenfm1 < m < 2n+µ(n+1)µ
and
4n2+µ(2n2+4n+µ)
2µn < m < fm2,
where em1 = 4n2+µ(2n2+4n+µ)2µn − √D2µn and em2 = 4n2+µ(2n2+4n+µ)2µn + √D2µn
with D =
¡
2n2 (µ+ 2) + µ (4n+ µ)
¢
(2n+ µ)2.
We can conclude that the followers’ profits increase in m over the interval
(fm1, n), since 2n+µ(n+1)µ , 4n2+µ(2n2+4n+µ)2µn and fm2 are greater than n.
We find ∂QLFq/∂m < 0 in the same interval (fm1, n). We finally find that
m1 > em1 is always verified under our hypotheses.
A6 Proof of proposition 5
We find that
∂πLFpi
∂m > 0 when m1 < m < m2,
where m1 = A−
√
B
4µn(1+µ) and m2 =
A+
√
B
4µn(1+µ)
with A = −2n (1 + µ) (µ (2n− 5) + 4n)− 3µ2
and B =
¡
8n (1 + µ) (µ (n− 2) + 2n) + 9µ2
¢
(µ (2n− 1) + 2n)2.
Since m1 < 0, the profits of each leader increase in m over the interval
(0,m2).
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As regards the profits of followers, we find that ∂π
LFp
k
∂m > 0 whenem1 < m < −µ(n−1)+2nµ
and −2µ
2n(n−2)+2µn(3n−2)+4n2+µ2
2µn(1+µ) < m < em2
where em1 = C−√D2µn(1+µ) and em2 = C+√D2µn(1+µ)
with C = −2n (1 + µ) (µ (n− 2) + 2n)− µ2
and D =
¡
2n (1 + µ) (µ (n− 2) + 2n) + µ2
¢
(µ (2n− 1) + 2n)2.
Since em1, −µ(n−1)+2nµ and −2µ2n(n−2)+2µn(3n−2)+4n2+µ22µn(1+µ) are always nega-
tive, the profits of each follower increase in m over the interval (0, em2). In the
same interval we find ∂QLFp/∂m < 0. We finally find that em2 < m2 is always
verified under our hypotheses.
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